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The Ministerial Exception:  
Theological and Legal Perspectives from Finland and Europe 
Pamela Slotte 
The issue of so-called ministerial exceptions from generally applicable laws has been widely 
and rather passionately debated in recent times. This essay approaches the issue by means of a 
succinct inquiry into the question of to what extent religious communities are, can, and should 
be exempt from general law. In elaborating on this issue, the article offers an account of two 
concrete examples of how governance through law in matters of faith is being conceptualized 
and approached: in the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, and in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights.1 
 
The Future Legal Arrangements of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland 
 
The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, a majority church, is currently revisiting its legal 
relations to the State and making decisions on how its activities ought to be regulated in law in 
the future.2 This is one dimension of an extensive review of all aspects and activities of the 
Church’s organization and administration. The goal is to improve the Church’s ability to carry 
out its foundational tasks in the future and to make sure that it is able to respond in an adequate 
way to the needs and challenges of the contemporary age. Is this, for example, best secured by 
the Church holding status under public law, or not? The overall work is headed by a special 
‘ELFC Committee for the Future’ (Kirkon tulevaisuuskomitea) appointed by the General Synod 
of the Evangelical Lutheran Church.3 
At present, a Church Act (Kirkkolaki (1054/1993)) regulates relations with the State and the 
order and administration of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. Here the order of 
enactment is central: The Church itself decides on the content of the Act collectively through 
its General Synod. The Finnish Parliament can only approve or reject an ecclesiastical bill. As 
stated in the Church Act: ‘The Church has the exclusive right to make legislative proposals for 
                                                
1 This essay was written as part of the author’s personal Academy of Finland Academy Research Fellow project 
“Management of the Sacred – A Critical Inquiry” (2013-2018). The essay in part expands some thoughts from a 
co-written article published in the Oxford Journal of Law and Religion. In it, we raised certain general 
theoretical questions that pertain to the matter of a ministerial exception, and we offered an overview of how the 
matter is being handled in international human rights law, within the United Nations and the European human 
rights systems. Pamela Slotte and Helge Årsheim, ‘The Ministerial Exception – Comparative Perspectives’, in 
Special Issue on The Ministerial Exception, (2015) 4 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 2, 171–98. 
2 I refer the reader to the recording of the speech by Lisbet Christoffersen at the Fourth ICLARS conference in 
Oxford, 8–11 September 2016, for a good overview of the current Nordic situation as regards state-religion 
relationships. Available at 
https://www.iclrs.org/index.php?pageId=4&linkId=225&contentId=21&blurbId=67428 (accessed 28 October 
2016). For a more comprehensive account see also Lisbet Christoffersen, Svend Andersen, and Kjell Å. Modéer, 
eds, Law and Religion in the 21st Century: Nordic Perspectives (Djøf Publishing 2010). 
3 Kirkkohallitus, Kirkon tulevaisuuskomitean mietintö, Suomen ev.-lut. Kirkon julkaisuja 47 (Kirkkohallitus 
2016), 3. Available at 
http://sakasti.evl.fi/sakasti.nsf/0/EE4CA05F09EA5A22C2257E70003B1F1B/$FILE/Kirkon%20tulevaisuuskomi
tea_Mietint%F6.pdf (accessed 27 October 2016). 
the enactment of the Church Act in all matters which concern solely its own affairs. It has the 
same right to propose amendments and repeal of the Church Act.’4 Thus, we are talking about 
a collective internal law, recognized by the State,5 which is expressive of the Church’s self-
understanding as both a social community and importantly a community of believers, and hence 
linked to the theological underpinnings of the Church. The confession of the Church is 
mentioned in the first paragraph of the Act, where it is also stated that it is further elaborated in 
the Church Order (Kirkkojärjestys (1055/1993)). 6  There is also a Church Election Order 
(Kirkon vaalijärjestys (416/2014)) that further specifies some of the rules on elections in the 
Church Act.7 The last two regulative instruments are subject to the exclusive authority of the 
General Synod.8 
As a majority church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church is very much intertwined with the 
Finnish State, which is manifested in the legal arrangements. For example, many parts of 
general administrative law and labor law apply to the Church. ‘Worldly law’ actually forms 
part of the law of the Church itself; the Church Act makes explicit references to relevant 
generally applicable laws. To take but one example, both office-holders and contractual 
employees – depending on whether their employment relationship is based on public law or not 
(and also ordained ministers can stand in an employment relationship) – have certain recourse 
to the judicial review of secular courts, either administrative or civil, in matters that concern 
                                                
4 Church Act (Kirkkolaki) 26.11.1993/1054, Chap. 2 Sec. 2(1). Translation taken from Ahtinen v. Finland, App. 
No. 48907/99 (ECtHR, 23 September 2008), § 17. The Constitution of Finland 11.6.1999/731, § 76 reads as 
follows:  
‘Provisions on the organization and administration of the Evangelic Lutheran Church are laid 
down in the Church Act. The legislative procedure for enactment of the Church Act and the 
right to submit legislative proposals relating to the Church Act are governed by the specific 
provisions in that Code. In church law is enacted the constitution and administration of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church. As concerns the order of enactment of church law and the 
initiative concerning church law, that which is in force is laid down in the aforementioned law 
separately.’  
Available at http://www.finlex.fi/sv/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf (accessed 27 October 2016). See 
also, for example, Kimmo Kääriäinen, ‘Religion and State in Finland’, (2011) 24 Nordic Journal of Religion and 
Society (2) 155–171, 160–161 and Pekka Leino, Kirkko ja perusoikeudet (doctoral dissertation) (Suomalainen 
Lakimiesyhdistys 2003), 103–109. 
5 What we see expressed here is a so-called ‘East Nordic’ understanding of the Church with its own internal 
order. It differs from how the situation developed after the Protestant Reformation in the West Nordic countries. 
See e.g. Lisbet Christoffersen, ‘The Argument for a Narrow Conception of “Religious Autonomy”’, (2015) 4 
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2) 278–302, 279. 
6 As is stated in Chapter 1 of the Church Act:  
Section 1. Confession: The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland professes the Christian 
faith which is based on the Bible and which has been expressed in the three creeds of the old 
church and in the Lutheran Confessions. The confession of the Church is articulated in more 
detail in the Church Order.  
Section 2. Task: In accordance with its confession, the church preaches God’s word and 
administers the sacraments and also otherwise seeks to spread the Christian message and 
realize neighborly love. 
7 For a compilation of the laws and other regulations of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland as it stood 
on 1 January 2016, see 
http://sakasti.evl.fi/sakasti.nsf/0/84759E9DB769A9A6C2257D94002752D4/$FILE/Kirkkolainsaadanto_2016_n
etti.pdf (accessed 25 October 2016). 
8 See e.g. Leino, supra note 4 at 170-173. There are also other laws that have been enacted exclusively for the 
purpose of being applied in the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, for example the Law on the Collective 
Labor Agreements of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (Laki evankelis-luterilaisen kirkon 
virkaehtosopimuksista) 20.12.1974/968. With regard to these, the previously mentioned order of enactment does 
not apply. Kirkkohallitus, ‘Kirkkolainsäädännön kodifioinnin esitysluonnos’, 22 March 2016, 10, available at 
http://sakasti.evl.fi/sakasti.nsf/0/FF04BB5160743CC8C2257F85002195AE/$FILE/Kodifiointiehdotus%202016,
%20maaliskuu.pdf (accessed 25 October 2016). 
their employment.9 Certain employment matters – although not, for example, the issue of 
whether someone should or should not be ordained in the first place – can be and have upon 
appeal been dealt with in regular administrative or civil courts, and courts have at times ruled 
that discrimination has taken place, that proper procedures have not been followed, etc.10 
This confirms, at least as far as the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland is concerned, 
what Russell Sandberg has noted, namely that while ‘religious law can be defined by reference 
to its purposes, sources, [and] subject-matter’,11 in all these areas there are overlaps with general 
law.12 Moreover, the Evangelical Lutheran Church assumes various functions related to public 
administration on behalf of the State, such as tasks in relation to the maintenance of the 
population register as well as funeral and burial services. All this may come with some cost of 
autonomy. However, the other side of the coin is that a change in status could eventually lead 
to less presence, less funding, and fewer possibilities to carry out the work of the Church, as 
this work is identified to its relevant parts as a ‘low-threshold’ majority church13 that seeks to 
make it easy for people to partake in church activities and make everyone feel welcome. 
The alternative future scenarios that the Committee for the Future initially put forward 
regarding the Church’s legal status and relations and legal code would have potentially 
expanded or limited the Church’s ability to decide fully independently what are the Church’s 
‘own matters’, regarding personnel issues or other matters. The first option would have been to 
carry on more or less as before. A second option was a more succinct so-called ‘framework law 
of the Church’, in relation to which the initiative in accordance with the order of enactment 
would remain with the Church. A third option was to pursue a ‘law of the Church’, which would 
be enacted as a normal law by Parliament; hence, the initiative for legislative changes would 
lie with the State, although the Church would be invited to give its views on the proposed 
changes.14 The last scenario would not give the Evangelical Lutheran Church quite the same 
influence over new legislation which concerns it. It is based on the idea of the State delegating 
authority and power to the Church.15 On the other hand, the last scenario would potentially 
distinguish more clearly between state and religion.16 
                                                
9 See Church Act (Kirkkolaki) 26.11.1993/1054, Part II, Chapters 5 and 6. Here, a change took place in 1997 
when Cathedral Chapters became part of the internal administration of the Church. They were no longer 
considered independent judicial bodies, something required for purposes of securing legal protection as required 
under the Finnish Constitution § 21, or Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. (They were later 
dealt with in Ahtinen v. Finland.) Opinions differ as to what it has meant. Pekka Leino, who is an expert on 
Finnish ecclesiastical law, finds that this change has limited the autonomy of the Church. Leino, supra note 4 at 
3. However, in a study conducted for the Committee for the Future, Juha Meriläinen observes that this change 
had few effects, in principle or in practice, for the Church. It simply meant the removal of the Cathedral Chapters 
as first instances of redress with regard to certain decisions by ecclesiastical bodies in their capacity as public 
authorities. Juha Meriläinen, ‘Kirkon julkisoikeudellinen asema’, 18 November 2015, 7, available at 
http://sakasti.evl.fi/sakasti.nsf/0/EE4CA05F09EA5A22C2257E70003B1F1B/$FILE/JuhaMeril%E4inen-
Kirkonjulkisoikeudellinenasema.pdf (accessed 1 November 2016). 
10 For a review of some recent cases, see Johannes Heikkonen and Pamela Slotte, ‘Religion and Discrimination 
Law in the European Union: Finland’, in Mark Hill, ed., Religion and Discrimination Law in the European 
Union – La discrimination en matière religieuse dans l’Union Européenne: Proceedings of the Conference, 
Oxford, 29 September–2 October 2011 – Actes du Colloque, Oxford, 29 septembre – 2 octobre 2011 (European 
Consortium for Church and State Research 2012), 125–144. 
11 Russell Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press 2011), 13. 
12 Sandberg at 172–178. 
13 See also Kirkkohallitus, supra note 3 at 135–139. 
14 Expert opinion to the Committee for the Future by Pekka Leino, ‘Kirkon organisaatiota ja hallintoa 
suunnittelevalle ja kirkon tulevaisuutta pohtivalle Kirkon tulevaisuuskomitealle’, 16 October 2015, 4–5. On file 
with the author. 
15 Christoffersen, supra note 5 at 289. 
16 To understand what it could mean, Pekka Leino refers to the current Law of the Orthodox Church (Laki 
ortodoksisesta kirkosta) 10.11.2006/985, which he finds actually regulates in some detail a number of issues 
related to administration, economy, processes of appeal, the general duties of priests, deacons, organists, etc. 
In March 2016, the plenary session of the National Church Council (Kirkkohallitus), one of 
the Church’s central administrative bodies, deliberated a proposal that a new Church Act 
replace the Church Act of 1993 by 2020 at the latest.17 As part of this, the legal system of the 
Church would be revised. It would include no drastic changes to the legal arrangement, being 
instead a structural reform aimed at simplifying and clarifying the current system. The proposal 
aims to combine three existing regulative instruments – the Church Act, the Church Order, and 
the Church Election Order – into one Church Act and one Church Order.18 
Under this proposal, the Church Act would regulate only those matters that require 
regulation in ordinary law – by implication, those matters that have a connection to the State. 
Moreover, independently of issues of autonomy, the Constitution requires that the rights and 
duties of the individual and ‘other matters that belong to the realm of law’ be regulated in law. 
Thus, this also applies – ‘with some flexibility perhaps’ – to the regulation of the Church. While 
the Church Act would regulate matters on a level of principle, the Church Order would 
concretize those principles.19 The Church Order could also include matters not covered by the 
Church Act, such as matters regarding the creed. In general, the Church Order would regulate 
matters in which the Church has ‘legislative authority’ and which do not require regulation in 
ordinary law.20 
As regards matters of employment pertaining to ordained ministers and other staff, these 
would continue to be regulated extensively and with reference to generally applicable law in 
the Church Act. Certain other dimensions, such as the qualifications needed for ordination to 
ministry, would continue to be regulated in the Church Order.21 
It is curious that the proposed new Church Act in Chapter 1, Section 5 still includes an order 
of enactment that repeats verbatim the current one: ‘The Church has the exclusive right to make 
legislative proposals for the enactment of the Church Act in all matters which concern solely 
its own affairs. It has the same right to propose amendments and repeal of the Church Act.’22 
One would think that the Church Act would make known the Church’s perspective on matters 
of ‘shared’ concern rather than matters that are ‘solely’ the Church’s own, and which would be 
regulated in the Church Order.23 
Various parties, such as the Employers’ Office of the Church (Kirkon työmarkkinalaitos), 
the Bishops’ Conference, the Cathedral Chapters, local congregations, and certain public 
authorities, have since been specially invited or otherwise allowed to give their opinions 
regarding the proposed changes. To mention just one important voice, in August 2016 the 
Bishops’ Conference issued its statement in response to the request by the National Church 
                                                
Leino, supra note 8 at 5. The Law of the Orthodox Church is available at 
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2006/20060985 (accessed 1 November 2016). 
17 Kirkkohallitus, supra note 8. For a short summary, see also 
http://sakasti.evl.fi/sakasti.nsf/sp?open&cid=Content3F92AE (accessed 25 October 2016). 
18 
http://evl.fi/EVLUutiset.nsf/Documents/CBC92DE19F5E67AAC2257F620048543A?OpenDocument&lang=FI 
(accessed 26 October 2016) and Kirkkohallitus, supra note 8 at 12–13. 
19 Kirkkohallitus at 12. The status of the Church under public law partly determines what can be regulated in the 
Church Act and the Church Order respectively. For example, the principle of the rule of law in Section 2 of the 
Constitution is important here. (Observation of Pirjo Pihjala, head of the Department of Administration of the 
National Church Council; on file with the author.) 
20 Kirkkohallitus at 12–13. 
21 Kirkkohallitus at 51–79 and 127–136. 
22 ‘Kirkolla on yksinoikeus ehdottaa kirkkolakia kaikesta, mikä koskee ainoastaan kirkon omia asioita, sekä 
kirkkolain muuttamista ja kumoamista.’ Kirkkohallitus at 158. Translation, as before, taken from Ahtinen v. 
Finland, supra note 4. 
23 On the other hand, the phrasing has a historical pedigree. Its roots can be traced back to the first Church Act of 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, the Church Act of 1869. At the time, Finland was a Grand Duchy 
of the Russian Empire. I am grateful to Pirjo Pihjala for pointing this out. 
Council. In it, the bishops note that the principled position of the Church and its relations to the 
State would not change because of the amendment of the law. What is at stake is primarily a 
legal-technical reform, the work on which has been carried out in awareness of what the Finnish 
Constitution and other relevant legislation requires. While adding some remarks that were 
partly of a critical nature, the bishops welcomed the overall proposed changes, finding that they 
satisfy current needs. Of interest here is that the bishops found that the reform would lead to 
something they have previously advocated for, namely a more succinct Church Act. The Act 
would refer to generally applicable laws of the land that apply to the Church, and it would 
regulate separately only those matters in which the Church wants to ‘deviate’ from generally 
applicable law. In turn, the Church Order, over which the Church has full authority, would 
include rules concerning internal matters of the Church.24 
The final report of the Committee for the Future was published in October 2016. It supports 
the position of the proposal by the National Church Council, stating that, in fact, ‘the significant 
streamlining of the Church Act and the transfer of regulations to the Church Order . . . would 
increase the Church’s autonomy’,25 and also make internal decision-making easier.26 It does 
not want to take a stand on the actual content of the proposal of the National Church Council 
and so interfere in its work. Yet, while the Committee for the Future sees that proposal as a step 
in the right direction, it would actually prefer an even ‘lighter’ Church Act.27 
In addition, during the drafting of the proposal for the future vision of the Church, which, 
as noted, also includes matters other than law, it was likewise the case that various parties with 
a vested interest were heard, as were external experts. This also included a large online 
discussion to hear feedback from people working in the Church as well as from those in 
positions of trust within the Church.28 Over 1,200 persons were invited to participate and of 
these 206, or about 17%, registered as participants.29 In this discussion, everyone underlined 
the importance of church autonomy, and a law and an order for the Church were considered 
important in order to safeguard this autonomy. However, opinions differed as to what should 
be the Church’s public law status in future, if indeed it should have one. Would it help the 
Church in its mission, and if so, in relation to which foundational tasks? In what respect is it to 
the advantage of the Church and in what respect is it not?30 
                                                
24 For the statement of the Bishops’ Conference on the proposal for a new Church Act see 
http://evl.fi/EVLUutiset.nsf/0/668C157713194B10C2258020003FD16B/$file/Kodifiointi_lausunto.pdf 
(accessed 26 October 2016). The Bishops’ Conference together with the General Synod and the National Church 
Council are the important organs of the central administration of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. 
Kirkkohallitus, supra note 3 at 177. In correspondence with Pirjo Pihjala on 19 November 2016 (on file with the 
author), Pihjala interestingly observed the following regarding statements made by the Ministry of Justice and 
the Ministry of Education and Culture with regard to the draft: The Ministry of Justice considered it possible to 
develop the Church Law in such a way that the regulation of ‘internal matters’ would become a matter where the 
Church has legislative authority, provided, however, that the demands of the Constitution are taken into account. 
The Ministry of Education and Culture observed that it may be possible, also from the perspective of 
constitutional law, to move more of the regulation that relates to the administration and economy of the Church 
to the organs of the Church itself. According to Pihjala, this shows that drawing a line between the Church Act 
and the Church Order is not unambiguous. 
25 Kirkkohallitus at 183; see also 56–57. 
26 Kirkkohallitus at 175. 
27 Kirkkohallitus at 56. 
28 Kirkkohallitus at 4–5. 
29 See the report ‘Suomen evankelis-luterilaisen kirkon työntekijöiden ja luottamushenkilöiden kuuleminen’ by 
Kirkon tulevaisuuskomitea, available at 
http://sakasti.evl.fi/sakasti.nsf/0/EE4CA05F09EA5A22C2257E70003B1F1B/$FILE/Meri-AnnaHintsala-
Verkkokeskustelu.pdf (accessed 25 October 2016). 
30 Kirkon tulevaisuuskomitea at 27. 
Another important group whose points of view the Committee for the Future took extra care 
to gather were the young members of the Church.31 In a course in comparative ‘religious and 
religion law’ in spring 2016, I also asked my students – most of whom were theology students 
who imagine that they will have a career in the Church – to reflect on the three earlier mentioned 
proposed future alternatives in their final essays. A clear majority of the students favored the 
status quo.32 
As always, what is at stake here and elsewhere are differing views of how God acts in the 
world, which values are foundational to Christianity and more specifically Lutheranism, the 
view of man and life here and now, and the relationship to the surrounding society. These affect 
how one relates to worldly law and those articulations of justice and foundational values which 
national, regional, and international law give expression to. Does one find that there are 
overlaps, common denominators, values, and purposes (for example, because one believes that 
humans even in the postlapsarian phase gain insight into what is right and good)? Or is the basic 
perspective that of contrasting the Christian community with the worldly community, from 
which it follows that ‘religious’ life is and should be reserved for the faithful themselves? For 
example, some of my students feared that the Church is being secularized both from within and 
from without and that law, including non-discrimination law, plays an important part here. They 
are surely not alone in this. 
 
The Ministerial Exception and ‘Secular’ Laws: Who Decides When Exceptions are Due? 
 
The same diagnosis – that religious communities have to ponder how to relate to worldly law 
and that easy answers or a uniform position on the matter can be hard to find– can be made in 
many other, diverse cases. We only need to consider how the position of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Finland seems to differ from that of the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in the United States, whose position in employment matters and worldly law 
and judicial review in relation to these in the case of ‘ministers’ was scrutinized in the high-
profile case of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission.33 To take just one example, the two churches clearly differ as regards 
the extent to which ‘Lutheran teachings require that disputes over ministry must be resolved 
internally’, with the U.S. church insisting on more autonomy in this area.34 
The diversity of religions, even among those who are closely related theologically, is 
certainly one reason for the manifoldness we witness in the field of religion and law. Even 
                                                
31 Kirkkohallitus at 5. 
32 Importantly, with the exception of a couple of students, they clearly saw national, regional, and international 
law not as a threat but as a complement to the internal regulation of the Church. On the other hand, there were 
also some students who found, for example, non-discrimination law and human rights law deeply problematic 
from the perspective of what they called a traditional Christian Lutheran view based on the Bible and the 
Confessions, and which, importantly for them, includes not accepting female priesthood. Yet these students 
favored the current model, surely for the present public role they wish to retain for Christianity in Finland. 
However, within it, they wanted to undo particular legislation and increase the scope of what would count as 
internal matters exclusive to the Church itself. Moreover, they were concerned with the way decision-making in 
the Church is detrimental to conservative minority positions within it. 
33 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
565 U.S. ___ (2012). The case has been the subject of ample commentary. For just a few reviews representing 
different opinions, see Douglas Laycock, ‘Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception’, (2012) 35 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Public Policy (3) 339–362, 849 and Marie Ashe, ‘Hosanna-Tabor, the Ministerial 
Exception, and Losses of Equality: Constitutional Law and Religious Privilege in the United States’, (2015) 4 
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2) 199–223. 
34 Laycock at 849. 
scholars of religion find it difficult to define what religion is;35 no wonder that legislators and 
courts struggle to decide what it means to have freedom of, for, from, and within religion, in a 
way that does not simply depict in a descriptive manner existing religious ways of being, but 
normatively and in a more generalizing fashion takes a stand on how freedom should be looked 
at and regulated in matters of faith, so as to provide tools for solving conflicts where 
interpretation stands against interpretation, ‘fundamental right’ against ‘fundamental right’, and 
so forth – as far as this essay is concerned, in questions that concern employees in churches, 
religious organizations, and other workplaces with a faith-based ethos. 
The ministerial exception could be seen as a way to conceptualize and handle frictions 
between collective religious views of life and society’s legislation. In an article co-written with 
Helge Årsheim in 2015, we note, by reference to Christopher Lund, that the ministerial 
exception can be defined as denoting ‘a cluster of legal statutes and practices that allow certain 
exclusive exemptions from otherwise generally applicable laws to religious organizations’.36 
Certainly, both perspectives are important here. Certain themes which are significant to a 
religious group, and which the group regulates, are of no obvious interest beyond the group 
itself. It is not that there would be no ‘compelling state interest’; there really is no interest at 
all. Or, phrased differently, one may not share the religious group’s position concerning a 
particular matter, but it is not something one finds that society’s legislation should concern 
itself with – quite the reverse. This also shows in the great agreement within law and among 
experts regarding certain matters. Creeds, for example, are considered virtually unanimously 
matters only for the religious groups themselves. Of course, it is always important to ask to 
what extent that which we take as self-evident is expressive of a blindness towards some 
expressions of faith. 
Likewise, at the other extreme, there are certain actions with purportedly religious 
motivations which cannot be tolerated at all, and states can legitimately prevent these. The 
question of a ministerial exception certainly does not belong in this category.37  
Certain themes, perhaps quite a few – particularly for majority religions, we might want to 
add – are of overlapping interest to both the religious community and the generally applicable 
law, among which employment is a salient one. Many times, religious communities find 
worldly legislation on employment matters adequate, and they accept it. Then the question of 
ministerial exception is moot. Additionally, in some matters where interests overlap, the 
legislation may perhaps be primarily of a technical nature to the state and an exception, if 
desired, is then not connected to great concessions. 
However, to a certain extent we are dealing here with legislation which in a particular way 
is seen as giving expression to societal values and principles of justice – and I am here speaking 
of something else than what is just ‘popular’ – like non-discrimination legislation. These 
situations are often labelled ‘hard cases’. 
It is clear that worldly authorities hold a trump card here.38 We are speaking of ‘exceptions’ 
from generally applicable law. Yet simultaneously, it is not – or we do not want to make it – as 
                                                
35 Slotte and Årsheim, supra note 1 at 2. For a short overview, see also Paul Weller et al., eds, Religion or Belief, 
Discrimination and Equality: Britain in Global Contexts (Bloomsbury 2013), 6–8. 
36 Slotte and Årsheim at 5. See also Christopher C. Lund, ‘In Defense of the Ministerial Exception’, (2011) 90 
North Carolina Law Review 1–72, 3. 
37 Cecile Laborde touched upon this in her speech at the Fourth ICLARS conference in Oxford 8–11 September 
2016. The recording is available at 
https://www.iclrs.org/index.php?pageId=4&linkId=225&contentId=21&blurbId=67428 (accessed 28 October 
2016). 
38 For example, Christoffersen has pointed out that in the East Nordic countries (Finland and Sweden) up until 
the end of the twentieth century, even if the majority churches were granted the right to develop internal norms, 
this was seen ‘from a jurisprudential perspective as a delegation of state powers’. Christoffersen, supra note 5 at 
280. 
easy as to simply allow worldly authorities to decide unilaterally when exceptions are due. 
There are various reasons for this; a topical way to make this point today is to point out ways 
in which ostensibly neutral and ‘religiously disinterested’ law in fact has its own biases about 
religion. Alvin Esau, for example, makes this point with reference also to the work of Benjamin 
Berger, who has held that ‘law’s modesty is always false’.39 In fact, he goes a step further and 
assigns to law its own ‘liberal’ faith, which ultimately takes precedence in so-called hard cases: 
 
I would say that law has its own religion that may well clash with other religions. And ‘law's 
religion,’ as Berger has called it, will talk about accommodation and tolerance, but when the 
stakes are high enough, it will pull out its guns and enforce its own integrity. Charter values will 
trump church values. The ‘rule of law’ becomes at some stage the notion that ‘law rules,’ and 
indeed that ’law overrules’ contrary claims by individuals and groups that their God rules and 
reigns. People who have a robust religion will live their lives within a theocracy, which simply 
means the rule of God. The rule of God may clash with the rule of law.40 
 
The relevant question thus becomes not whether generally applicable laws should yield, but 
whose perspective should take precedence when it comes to deciding which questions and in 
what situations generally applicable law should yield.41 There are those who assert that the 
interpretative prerogative should always belong to the religious groups themselves. These know 
best when the friction becomes so great that, from a religious perspective, they would be forced 
to make too significant sacrifices were they required to follow generally applicable law.42 
Nevertheless, not everyone reasons in this way. 
                                                
39 Benjamin L. Berger, ‘Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture’, (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall Law Journal (2) 277–314, 
311, available at http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol45/iss2/2 (accessed 1 November 2016). As 
Berger puts it: ‘[L]aw defines rights and uses power and violence to enforce its vision, its claim rapidly assumes 
the greater form – the comprehensive claim about religion. . . . what religion relevantly is. This is the essence of 
Robert Cover’s insight that law is jurispathic: that, whether it intends it or not, the very nature of law is that it 
kills other normative arrangements and interpretations.’ Berger wants to speak of law being ‘epistemologically 
colonial’. Berger at 311–312. See also Robert M. Cover, ‘The Supreme Court 1982 Term – Foreword: Nomos 
and Narrative’, (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review (4). 
40Alvin J. Esau, ‘“Islands of Exclusivity” Revisited: Religious Organizations, Employment Discrimination and 
Heintz v. Christian Horizons’, (2009-2010) 15 Canadian Labour & Employment Law Journal (3) 389–434, 429. 
See also Berger, supra note 39. Berger makes certain observations regarding law’s religion in a Canadian 
constitutional context to tease out the cultural embeddedness of the legal approach. What Berger sheds light on 
resonates with other recent work trying to tease out implicit understandings of law that influence ‘secular’ 
adjudication in matters of faith: religion is seen as largely a private matter; the focus is on the individual, on 
choice and autonomy. Berger at 283. 
41 I am simplifying here for the sake of the argument. This matter can be further qualified by asking at what level 
and stage decisions on exceptions for religion from generally applicable law should be made – either for 
specifically identified groups or particular activities or in general ‘neutral’ terms – and what the consequences of 
this are. Should it be done when a law is enacted or when it is interpreted? Marie Ashe, for example, finds the 
situation in the United States problematic, where after the 1990 Supreme Court decision in Employment 
Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, and the subsequent Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 
the statutory protection of religious liberty and accommodation for religion has drastically increased beyond 
what was earlier guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. Ashe, supra note 39 at 209–210. See also for example 
Yossi Nehushtan, ‘The Case for a General Constitutional Right to be Granted Conscientious Exemption’, (2016) 
5 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2) 230–254 and Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the 
Liberal State (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2013), 359–361, for a discussion of this. 
42 This may come accompanied by the further assertion that this religious appraisal that accommodation is 
necessary cannot legitimately become the object of external assessment and judicial evaluation. Deference is 
required not only because, for example, the judiciary is poorly equipped when it comes to religious expertise, but 
also because this would be to venture into an area which is none of one’s business. Mark O. DeGirolami, 
‘Religious Accommodation, Religious Tradition, and Political Polarization’, Lewis & Clark Law Review, 
forthcoming 2017, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2835231 (accessed 11 November 2016). 
At the beginning of the article co-written with Årsheim, we mention the central distinction 
between an internal and an external perspective regarding religion. Should religious traditions 
be conceptualized with the help of their own categories, vocabularies, and ways of reasoning, 
or should we approach them from the outside with the help of ‘neutral’ categories that are not 
at home in any specific tradition? The latter seems impossible to achieve, not least given the 
diversity among religions,43 but also for reasons such as those pointed out by Esau and Berger, 
amongst others. We note that religious traditions form their own identities and provide self-
definitions. The question is, though, whether these are sufficient in all situations and for all 
purposes, for example, when the task is to decide whether an exception should be made to 
generally applicable law.44 
I want to argue that it is one thing to affirm as a matter of principle that, usually, an 
individual will have the best insight into who he or she is and wants. (Although we should not 
underestimate the human ability of intentional or unintentional self-deception.45) What weight 
can or should be attributed to this in different situations is a different question, though. When 
we are dealing with a collective, the matter is rendered more difficult still by the fact that, as 
the short snapshots from current discussions within the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland 
and among my students show, an internal perspective is seldom completely uniform;46 nor can 
we always unambiguously distinguish between an internal and an external perspective. Both as 
regards notions and values, and concrete regulation, there are overlaps, as I already noted with 
reference to Sandberg. 
Now, religious traditions have different ways of viewing and localizing authority and 
making decisions. This naturally must be taken into account and respected.47 Yet, what this 
should or will mean in practice is not completely clear-cut, precisely for other reasons, such as 
those I have mentioned above. Various presentations at the Fourth ICLARS conference in 
Oxford in September 2016 put forward ways to go about this.48 Here I merely wish to offer an 
overview of how the European human rights system currently handles these issues, in the 
context of which it has also dealt with a case concerning the Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Finland, Ahtinen v. Finland. 
                                                
43 Slotte and Årsheim, supra note 1 at 2. See also Russell T. McCutcheon, ed., The Insider/Outsider Problem in 
the Study of Religion: A Reader (Cassell 1999), which through its selection of classic and contemporary 
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44 Slotte and Årsheim at 2. 
45 Here I refer the reader to the talk by Andrew Koppleman at the Fourth ICLARS conference in Oxford 8–11 
September 2016. The recording of the talk is available at 
https://www.iclrs.org/index.php?pageId=4&linkId=225&contentId=21&blurbId=67428 (accessed 28 October 
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46 See also, for example, Greg Walsh, ‘Anti-Discrimination Legislation and Regulation of Employment 
Decisions of Religious Schools in Australia’, in W. Cole Durham, Jr. and Donlu Thayer, eds, Religion and 
Equality: Law in Conflict, ICLARS Series in Law and Religion (Routledge 2016), 80–81. 
47 This is of course also something law does. For example, the way that the ECHR is currently interpreted, an 
individual cannot make a claim to religious freedom against the community of which she forms a part, other than 
by exiting that community, nor against the religious community or organization for which she works and whose 
rules she has signed up to and must follow. In this respect, the perspective differs from the focus on the 
individual so central to human rights law. See, for example, X v. Denmark, App. No. 7374/76 (ECmHR, 8 March 
1976), 158. See also, for example, Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Belief under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press 2001), 85; Ahdar and Leigh, supra note 41 at 392–393; Walsh, supra note 46 at 
84–85; and Laycock, supra note 24 at 856. 
48 For recordings of the talks at the conference, see 
https://www.iclrs.org/index.php?pageId=4&linkId=225&contentId=21&blurbId=67428 (accessed 28 October 
2016). Some of the written presentations have also been published at 
https://www.iclrs.org/event.php/ICLARS+IV+(Oxford)+2016/Presentations/English (accessed 28 October 
2016). For examples of what positions theorists take as far as religious exemptions to non-discrimination 
legislation are concerned, see also, for example, Ahdar and Leigh, supra note 41 at 361–363. 
 
The Discussion within the European Human Rights System 
 
On the question of the ministerial exception, where does the European human rights system 
stand after cases such as Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy, the German cases of Obst, Schüth, and 
Siebenhaar, the chamber and Grand Chamber judgments of Fernández Martínez v. Spain and 
Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania, the recent case of Travaš v. Croatia, or indeed 
Ahtinen v. Finland? These are cases which have dealt with the character of a particular office 
or employment, the nature of the employment relationship, reasons for dismissal or non-
renewal of contract, and related matters.49 
Within the European human rights system, the matters at stake are conceptualized in terms 
of collective religious autonomy or church autonomy, and its scope and limits, rather than 
explicitly in terms of ‘ministerial exceptions’.50 It is not a surprising way of framing what is at 
stake. Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh have defined ‘religious group autonomy’ as ‘broadly speaking, 
the right of religious communities to determine and administer their own internal religious 
affairs without interference from the state’.51 Adding to this, Julian Rivers has defined this 
autonomy as ‘the power of a community for self-government under its own law’.52 
Religious communities as such enjoy rights under the European Convention of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg considers religious autonomy to be an important part of the freedom of religion or 
belief and connects it with an idea of justified religious diversity, making clear that religious 
autonomy presupposes state neutrality, in the sense of non-interference and ‘disinterest’, to a 
certain extent. Religious communities can freely determine their own doctrines and also how 
they want to communicate these, for example, through rituals and worship. Communities can 
freely regulate membership, i.e. choose and exclude followers. This also goes for the persons 
whom they wish to entrust with religious tasks.53 It is to be assumed that this may include 
voluntarily adhering to the standards of generally applicable law in certain respects, as the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Finland does. 
However, in Europe the organizational life and internal governance of religious 
communities is not completely beyond judicial scrutiny, and state interference can be justified 
on certain grounds. As Dominic McGoldrick has stated, comparing the situation in Europe to 
that in the United States, ‘the legal black hole is decisively small and even within it some legal 
principles apply.’54 In regard to the chamber judgment in the case of Fernández Martínez v. 
Spain, McGoldrick notes that the role of the Strasbourg court is to make sure that the 
foundational principles of general national law and the dignity of the individual are respected, 
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50 Slotte and Årsheim, supra note 1 at 10. 
51 Ahdar and Leigh, supra note 41 at 376, making reference to Mark E. Chopko, ‘Constitutional Protection for 
Church Autonomy: A Practitioner’s View’, in Gerhard Robbers, ed., Church Autonomy: A Comparative Survey 
(Peter Lang Publishers 2001), 95–116, 96. 
52 Julian Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and Secularism (Oxford University 
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Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland sees the law of the land also in part as its own law. 
53 See e.g. Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96 (ECtHR, 26 October 2000), §§ 60 and 62, and 
Fernández Martínez (Grand Chamber), § 127. 
54 Dominic McGoldrick, ‘Religion and Legal Spaces – In Gods We Trust; in the Church We Trust, but Need to 
Verify’, (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review (4) 759–786, 783. 
and states must judiciously balance the rights and interests of the different parties.55 What does 
this mean? 
When it comes to matters of employment, it seems that religious associations or 
organizations with a faith-based ethos that function as employers (and I here use ‘employer’ 
and ‘employee’ in a generic sense for reasons of simplicity) cannot deviate from generally 
applicable law, including from labor law and non-discrimination law, to an extent that would 
disregard the fundamental rights of the employees.  
 Certainly, depending on the nature of the work, deviation from generally applicable norms 
may be acceptable practice when it comes to employees performing religious tasks. Moreover, 
religious organizations can demand loyalty – in some cases even a ‘heightened’ duty of loyalty 
– from those working for them, provided that the demands are not ‘unreasonable’ and concern 
issues that are central or indeed of crucial importance to the organization in question.56 Still, by 
taking up employment in a religious organization, employees cannot be considered to have 
waived all their rights, like the right to freedom of expression57 or the right to privacy or family 
life, in their entirety.58 
Moreover, employees should enjoy procedural protection. They should have access to 
judicial review of decisions affecting them.59 From this it follows that when dealing with 
situations of conflict involving a private employer and its employees, states have a positive duty 
under the ECHR to make sure that employees have the opportunity ‘to have a decision that 
concerns the terms of employment and its possible termination examined by a court of law’.60 
Examples here include the three German cases mentioned above, where the employees were 
dismissed on grounds of having acted in ways that contradicted the doctrines of the religious 
organizations for which they worked. 
Importantly, and following Carolyn Evans and Anna Hood, it seems that the approach of 
the Court at this point in time may signal something more than ‘simply’ procedural safeguards. 
Evans and Hood want to speak of substantive limitations on employment autonomy,61 for once 
a case ends up before the Strasbourg court, it will submit the actions of the state to scrutiny: 
have employees had the possibility to submit their cases for review by public authorities and 
have national courts struck a fair balance between the rights, freedoms, and interests of 
employees and religious employers? 62  Have these taken into account the position of the 
employee in the organization, the nature of the work – where depending on its nature and status 
there may even have been a heightened duty of loyalty – the length of employment, the 
possibility to find other work, and so forth? 
This evaluation may include taking into account religious law as part of valid law, to the 
extent that state law has recognized this, for example, following international agreements 
between the state and a church. The cases of Fernández Martínez v. Spain and Sindicatul 
“Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania offer examples of this, as does the most recent case of Travaš 
                                                
55 McGoldrick at 783. 
56 See, for example, Merilin Kiviorg, ‘Collective Religious Autonomy versus Individual Rights: A Challenge for 
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60 Slotte and Årsheim at 11.  
61 Carolyn Evans and Anna Hood, ‘Religious Autonomy and Labour Law: A Comparison of the Jurisprudence of 
the United States and the European Court of Human Rights’, (2012) 1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (1) 
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62 See, for example, Schüth, § 67; Siebenhaar, § 45; and Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” (Grand Chamber), § 159. 
v. Croatia. In this last case, the applicant challenged his dismissal as a layman teacher of 
religious education due to the fact that he had entered into a new civil marriage without a 
previous annulment of his earlier religious marriage. According to the applicant, the dismissal 
lacked a valid legal basis. 63  The Strasbourg court found that there was an international 
agreement between Croatia and the Holy See on education and cultural affairs, and an act 
ratifying this agreement – an international treaty – had come into force. This made the 
agreement, which among other things spelled out the terms of employment and the 
qualifications that teachers of religious education needed to meet, part of the law of the land.64 
The interference with what the applicant claimed was his right to private life and family life 
was lawful. (The Strasbourg court also made direct reference to relevant parts of the Code of 
Canon Law in its judgment.65) 
Returning to Finland, in the case of Ahtinen v. Finland, for example, a pastor in the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland disputed the presence of a valid legal basis for his 
transfer from one parish to another. However, the Strasbourg court, making reference amongst 
other things to the Church Act of 1993, found that the decision by the Cathedral Chapter in 
question was based on domestic law in force at the relevant time, and that the applicant’s 
procedural rights had not been violated.66 
We may, of course, also have cases where the state has been directly involved in a case,67 
and its actions – resulting in an interference – are submitted to the usual tests of legality, 
necessity, and proportionality. This test will de facto include careful scrutiny of many, if not 
most, of the aspects mentioned above; not least given the fact that it is difficult to pinpoint ‘the 
boundaries between the State’s positive and negative obligations’, and similar ‘applicable 
principles’ apply, including a fair balance between different interests and rights.68 
Now, certainly, the Strasbourg court does not want to take a stand on what is or is not 
religion, or indeed orthodoxy.69 Apart from in ‘very exceptional cases’, it is not considered 
justified under Article 9 for states to assess the legitimacy of religious, or indeed other, beliefs 
or the means by which they are expressed.70 Approval or disapproval should not be a standard 
criterion when deciding whether or not to afford religious freedom protection to individuals or 
groups. Yet perhaps what we are witnessing is partly a downplaying of what denoting 
something as religion or religious accomplishes in the context of European human rights law. 
It is not about relativizing religion per se, nor about denying that something is a religious matter, 
but that denoting something as religious – and the Strasbourg court may accept at face value 
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the framing of a matter as put forward by the religious community itself71 – does not necessarily 
move the matter completely beyond examination. Nor does it automatically posit it above other 
issues (values and interests) at stake, nor beyond the reach of generally applicable law. 
The situation under consideration, though in part ‘religious’ in nature, may still 
simultaneously be a ‘non-religious matter’ in certain respects and hence not fully beyond 
‘secular’ law.72 The two perspectives are not mutually exclusive.73 As the Strasbourg court 
noted in the Grand Chamber judgment of Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania with regard 
to a group of priests of the Romanian Orthodox Church, it may be that some of the priests’ 
duties could ‘amount to an employment relationship rendering applicable the right to form a 
trade union within the meaning of Article 11’.74 Referring to the standards of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), the Strasbourg court found that many characteristics of the 
employment relationships were de facto present alongside duties of a more spiritual or religious 
nature. This was so independently of how the parties themselves had framed the relationship in 
question, by way of contract or in another way.75 
Moreover, in the Grand Chamber judgment of Fernández Martínez v. Spain, the Court did 
assess the quality of the original ecclesiastical decision, finding that it was sufficiently reasoned, 
was not arbitrary, and had been made for the purpose of exercising religious autonomy.76 
In the same judgment, the Court also noted that to justify a religious community in reacting 
to a threat arising from actions of dissenters, the threat must be ‘probable and substantial’,77 
echoing the Grand Chamber ruling in Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania, where it stated 
that the threat had to be ‘real and substantial’.78 That ruling stated that religious communities 
have a right to react to what threatens ‘their cohesion, image or unity’,79 or ‘integrity’, to pick 
up Cecile Laborde’s terminology from her presentation during the Fourth ICLARS conference 
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74 § 141. 
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77 Fernández Martínez (Grand Chamber), § 129. 
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in Oxford.80 However, the risk brought about by, for example, the actions of employees, has to 
be real and substantial. Moreover, actions taken must not ‘go beyond what is necessary to 
eliminate the risk’, and may not serve any purpose ‘unrelated to the exercise of the religious 
community’s autonomy’.81 This points to an external assessment being possible even with 
regard to what may be framed as ‘religious matters’, at least as far as the implications are 
concerned. 
Likewise, in Travaš v. Croatia, the Strasbourg court, making reference to the case of 
Fernández Martínez v. Spain, stated that in addition to the fact that actions taken must be for 
the purpose of eliminating a risk related to the exercise of church autonomy, ‘[i]t should be 
remembered that such an autonomy is not absolute and cannot be exercised in a matter affecting 
the substance of the right to private and family life.’ It is to certify that the above criteria are 





Some commentators will surely see the position of the Strasbourg court as judicial second-
guessing of and excessive meddling in internal religious governance, perhaps even arguing that 
when a community draws on both religious law and the generally valid law in going about its 
business, this should not be seen as opening the possibility of external judicial review.83 Still, 
the position of the Strasbourg court is one position among many today. It is clear that within 
different jurisdictions, different (legal) conceptions of what constitutes ‘law’ and ‘religion’ (and 
the ‘secular’) are at play, resulting in very different conditions for religious communities. The 
exceptions from otherwise generally applicable law may be narrowly or widely construed.84 
Moreover, religious communities hold different views of what exceptions are needed and they 
seek to regulate their communal life accordingly, as the review of the discussion within the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland makes clear. 
Reflecting on this diversity and acknowledging also the extent to which non-discrimination 
legislation has increased and been extended to new issues and groups, and also that religious 
diversity has increased within many states,85 it seems that sticking to rigid categories of law 
and religion will not take us very far. This expansion and diversification of both the legal and 
the religious realms has consequences for how we might judge suggestions for how to go about 
identifying the space of justified religious autonomy and for how we allocate authority. Some 
will say that given the diversity, and also given the lack of trust toward the state that perhaps 
especially minority religious communities will exhibit, the way to deal with it all in a sensitive 
manner would be to hand over authority whole-heartedly to the communities themselves. 
However, in relation to this, Saba Mahmood, in her recent book Religious Difference in a 
Secular Age, points out, with reference to Talal Asad, that asserting that religion belongs ‘to a 
private sphere to be ruled by its own unique set of laws . . . amplifies the secular distinction 
between civil and religious jurisdictions’, where in addition ‘in the modern dispensation, 
secular law by virtue of its claim to universality necessarily appears neutral and, by contrast, 
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religious law appears particular and partial.’86 This is a very one-sided picture that seems 
difficult to retain in light of the actual diversity, and it may come at the cost of reification of 
unfeasible notions and distinctions. 
What I am inclined to believe at the moment is that we are, in a way, left with a paradox. It 
is exactly the presumed legitimate inability to compromise that will activate the need for 
accommodation and ministerial exceptions. Yet as Isaac Weiner has pointed out, if we portray 
religion as ‘absolutist, inflexible, [and] resistant to compromise’, ‘flexibility’ and ‘pragmatic 
compromise’ in matters of religion will be viewed with skepticism, and this will favor rigid 
religious positions rather than those (individuals and groups) who in various ways ‘negotiate 
their religious identities from within disciplinary power structures’. 87  Religious freedom, 
according to Weiner, is then turned ‘into a tool for enforcing orthodoxy, allowing little space 
for difference and dissent, let alone inconsistency and inconstancy’, ‘collapsing internal 
heterogeneities into an idealized model of communal consent’.88 
In light of this, the current position of the Strasbourg court does seem prudent, despite the 
criticism that so often also rightly has been directed at it. It seems that, in Europe at least, 
authority in matters of religion is, in fact, multi-located and multi-voiced. Depending on the 
concrete subject matter, it is also more or less clearly allocated with religious communities 
themselves or the governance is shared.89 
Finally, I imagine that in the end, we do not get around the fact that it comes down to values 
and value choices at a general level and at a specific level in particular contexts. We have to 
take a stand, and to some extent fill that void of meaning at the heart of legal governance to 
which Zachary Calo was alluding in his talk at the Fourth ICLARS conference in Oxford.90 
What are the concerns for which granting a ministerial exception may seem an adequate societal 
response? And when is it not acceptable? The values have to be articulated – be it about 
integrity, giving due recognition to minority positions, etc. – and choices have to be justified. 
Yet, boundaries have been drawn differently during different times in history and in 
different legal and religious contexts, and so it will remain.91 The direction is not simply about 
moving towards more or less religious autonomy and exceptions. Instead, it is about 
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continuously being aware of the complexity of the matters at hand and about making well-
considered decisions which for the moment will hopefully come across as the ‘legally correct’ 
ones and be acceptable to those concerned, but which we, at least with the limited perspective 
of life here on earth, can take neither as absolute nor as unchangeable. 
